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THE CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF
THE CROWN AND ITS AGENTS©
By SUE ARROWSMITH*
This article considers the question of the capacity in which Crown agents
enter into contracts - whether on behalf of the Crown or in an
independent capacity - and examines the significance of this for questions
such as the application of Crown immunities. It is argued that the courts'
attempt to deal with these questions through the recognition of a dual
capacity in Crown agents and the application of the private law of agency
is highly unsatisfactory, and it is suggested that this area well illustrates
the pressing need to reconsider the dual legal status of the administration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The central governments of Canada and of the individual
provinces do not consist of a single entity of the State, but are
characterized by a certain duality. On the one hand, many of the
powers of the Executive, both common law and statutory, are vested
in "The Crown."1  These powers are presently not exercised
personally by the monarch but by government bodies and officials
acting on behalf of the Crown.2 On the other hand, powers have
also sometimes been conferred on public authorities in an
independent capacity. Many public authorities also act in a dual
capacity, exercising some powers as agents of the Crown and other
powers on their own behalf.
In considering the legal liability of the government, it is not
always clear in which capacity, or capacities, a power is given to a
I On the nature of the Crown in the Canadian jurisdictions, see D.W. Mundell, 'qhe
Legal Nature of Federal and Provincial Executive Governments: Some Comments on
Transactions Between Them" (1960) 2 Osgoode Hall LJ. 56.
2 The better view is that in acting in public affairs these authorities are not in fact acting
in law on behalf of the monarch at all, but on behalf of a common law corporation which has
legal powers distinct from those of the monarch personally. On this, see S. Arrowsmith,
Government Procurement and Judicial Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 109-29.
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public authority, or in which capacity it is exercised in a particular
case. One area in which this causes difficulties is in relation to the
contractual activities of the Administration: when a public body
enters into a contract, on whom does legal liability rest - the agency
itself or the Crown? Several important consequences may depend
on the answer to this question. In particular, there are a number of
legal rules which apply to the Crown but not to other public
authorities. However, as is frequently the case with issues of
government liability, legal doctrine on this point has become
characterized by an unfortunate degree of complexity and
uncertainty. It is the aim of this article to outline the current legal
position, and to highlight the main problems within this area of the
law. In doing so, this paper hopes to illustrate the pressing need for
a more rational and coherent approach to questions of state liability,
a point which was recently expressed in a Canada Law Reform
Commission Working Paper.
3
The discussion of the present law will be divided into two
main parts. The first part considers the basic question: when does
a public authority undertake liability on its own behalf, and when on
behalf of the Crown? The second part will examine the significance
of this question of capacity, both for the government and for the
other party to the contract. These two questions are very
interrelated since the consequences of the capacity in which a
contract is made have shaped the decisions concerning the nature of
the government's capacity to contract. However, for the sake of
clarity in a complex area, it is convenient to consider the two
questions separately.
3 Law Reform Commission Of Canada, The Legal Status of the Federal Administration
(Working Paper 40) (Ottawa: The Commission, 1985). The methodology of the Commission
and some of its reasoning have been subject to heavy criticism: see in particular D. Cohen,
"Thinking about the State, Law Reform and the Crown in Canada" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall
L.i. 379. However, the Commission's basic point regarding the need for a reappraisal of the
legal status of the Administration cannot be questioned.
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]1. THE CAPACITY IN WHICH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
CONTRACT
A. General Pinciples
How does one determine the capacity in which any particular
contract is made? In considering liability on government contracts,
and the relationship between the Crown and specific public
authorities, the law has employed the same basic concepts of agency
that apply to private individuals and corporations. In any agency
situation, it is necessary to consider the question of liability for
contracts made by the agent from two perspectives.
The first is that of the parties to the principal-agency
relationship inter se: which one is ultimately, or primarily, liable for
the cost of performing the particular contract? In general terms, a
person is primarily liable for a contract made by his agent when it
is made for the purposes of the principal and is within the scope of
the express or implied authority of the agent. But if the agent
makes the contract for his own purposes, or outside the scope of his
authority, he bears the primary liability.
The second perspective of liability is the position of principal
and agent vis-al-vis the other party to the agreement: which one is
party to the contract made? The law admits of three possibilities:
that the agent alone is liable, that only the principal is liable, or that
both principal and agent are party to the contract.4 An agent may
make himself a party, either alone or with his principal, even though
he acts for the purposes of the principal and within the scope of his
authority, so that the principal is primarily liable. In such a case,
the principal must indemnify the agent for any costs incurred as a
result of the agent's own liability on the agreement.5 Thus, when a
public authority makes a contract, it is necessary to consider whether
the Crown or the agent itself is ultimately liable. In addition, it
4 See F.M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead on Agency, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985)
at 426-40.
5 See, generally, ibid at 210-245.
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must be determined who is actually a party to the agreement - the
Crown, the agent, or both.
These issues are determined partly by judicial decisions and
partly by legislation. It is convenient to consider them by examining
three questions. First, what is the scope of a public authority's
power to conclude a contract on behalf of the Crown? Second,
what is the scope of its power to undertake liability in its own
name? At this point, it is necessary to consider how far it may
undertake primary liability, as opposed simply to making itself party
to a contract for which the Crown is primarily responsible. Finally,
one must consider in what capacity, or capacities, the authority has
acted in the particular case.
B. The Scope of Powers to Contract on Behalf of the Crown
The power of an administrative authority to make contracts
on behalf of the Crown depends on two things: the scope of the
Crown's own capacity to make contracts, and the scope of the
particular agent's authority to enter into the contract on the Crown's
behalf. The first generally presents no difficulty since the Crown
possesses at common law a capacity to contract which is equivalent
to that of any natural person of full age and capacity. 6 Therefore,
the Crown lacks the capacity to make a contract only to the extent
that its power is cut down by statute.
The extent to which individual public bodies have authority
to exercise this power on the Crown's behalf is more complicated.
One must ask, first, if a body is an agent of the Crown, and, second,
if it is, what is the scope of its authority to bind the Crown?
7
6 See R. Dussault & L. Borgeat, Administrative Law, 2d ed., trans. M. Rankin (Toronto:
Carswell, 1985) at 483-84. For a full discussion of the question, see Arrowsmith, supra, note
2 at 109.
7 Since many bodies act sometimes in an independent capacity and sometimes on behalf
of the Crown, it may seem logical to consider directly what is the scope of an authority's
agency for the Crown. However, this is a useful functional approach (and one used in the
cases and legislation) since most act either predominantly on behalf of the Crown or
predominantly on their own behalf. The term Crown agent is a useful general description of
the former type.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Who is a Crown agent? Clearly the Ministers of the Crown
are its agents. In the case of other bodies, the common law test for
Crown agency, developed mainly in determining the Crown's
immunity from suit in tort, focuses mainly on the degree of control
exercised over the body by the Ministers of the Crown. This test
was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Northern Pipeline
Agency v. Perehinec.8  Other factors, though, are also taken into
account. Space does not permit a detailed discussion here of the
nature of the common law test,9 but there has been much criticism
of the uncertainty, inconsistency, and expansiveness in the
application of the test, which has the consequence of allowing a
large range of commercial-type bodies to claim many of the benefits
of Crown immunity.
To some extent the question is now dealt with by statute.
Both federal and provincial statutes creating public authorities now
often expressly state that the authority is to have Crown agency
status. Some statutes have also dealt with the question at a more
general level. In Ontario, "Crown agency" is defined in the Crown
Agency Act, which was enacted to bring certain bodies within the
ambit of Crown immunity from excise tax, although the definition is
not confined to such purposes. A Crown agent is defined as a body
"owned, controlled or operated by Her Majesty under the authority
of the legislature or the Lieutenant Governor in Council."10 Clearly
the application of this test must depend heavily on case law. At
present, the Government Corporations Operation Act11 deals
specifically with corporations, created under Part I of the Canada
Corporations Act 2 or under the Canada Business Corporations Act,
13
8 [1983] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter Perehinec].
9 On this see P. Vita, "Relief Against the Crown: Who to Sue" in Civil Proceedings by
orAgainst the Government (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association - Ontario, Continuing Legal
Education, 1985) at 14-17; C.H. McNairn, 'The Ontario Crown Agency Act" (1973) 6 Ottawa
L. Rev. 1; R. Flanagan, "Crown Agent Status" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 229.
10 R.S.O. 1980, c. 106, s. 2.
11 R.S.C. 1985, c. G-4.
12 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32.
13 R.S.C. 1985, c. C44.
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of which all the shares1 4 are owned by or held in trust for Her
Majesty. Such corporations are expressly stated to be Crown
agents.15 It may be noted that a body or individual which does not
normally act as a Crown agent may sometimes act as such for
limited purposes. This situation usually arises from an agreement
between the Crown and that party, not from statute
6
Even where a body is a Crown agent, it can only bind the
Crown in contract if it has the authority to make the particular
agreement on the Crown's behalf. It is generally assumed that a
Crown agent has the authority to make any contract which is
ancillary to the substantive functions which it is authorized to carry
out. Thus, if an agent authority is established in order to construct
a highway, for example, it will have authority to make on behalf of
the Crown, any contracts necessary to enable it to perform that
function - contracts to purchase materials, to employ engineers, et
cetera. The test for determining the scope of such a body's
authority to contract on behalf of the Crown seems to be the same
as that for determining the scope of the capacity to contract of non-
natural persons of limited capacity which are not Crown agents, such
as municipal corporations and (in some jurisdictions) 17 private
business corporations. These bodies have an implied capacity to
make contracts which are reasonably necessary to carry out the
functions they are authorized to perform.
1 8
At one time there was uncertainty concerning the scope of
the authority of Ministers of the Crown; some cases stated that they
did not have the authority to make contracts in connection with any
matter within their general statutory jurisdiction, but required such
authority from a specific statutory provision or an Order in
14 With the exception, where relevant, of the directors' qualifying shares.
15 Supra, note 11, s. 3.
16 On this, see Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (P.C.).
17 In some jurisdictions, business corporations have an unlimited capacity to contract (in
others, ultra vires contracts are now generally enforceable by third parties).
18 Ashbury Railway and Carriage Co. v. Riche (1875), 7 L.R. 653 (H.L.); A.G. v. Great
Eastern Railway (1880), 5 App. Cas. 473 (H.L.).
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Council.19 However, in JE. Verault & Fils Ltde v. A.G. Quebec,20
the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the test for determining
the authority of Ministers to bind the Crown is the same as the
authority test in private law: the Crown will be bound if the agent
has actual or ostensible authority. How actual authority is to be
determined in public law is far from clear: arguably specific
legislative authority is still required.21  What does seem clear,
however, is that the doctrine of ostensible authority will now make
a Minister's contract binding where it relates to the general area of
his statutory jurisdiction, 22 unless his authority is specifically curtailed
by statute.
23
C. Scope of the Independent Capacity to Contract
So far we, have considered the power of public authorities
to make contracts on behalf of the Crown. The next issue, the
scope of their powers to contract in their own name, is less
straightforward.
A public authority, which is a corporation and which does
not exercise its powers on behalf of the Crown, possesses a capacity
to contract under the rule already referred to - that corporate
bodies have an implied capacity to make contracts which are
reasonably necessary to enable them to carry out their functions.
What of unincorporated bodies which are not Crown agents? The
1 9 De Cosmos v. R (1883), 1 B.C.R. 26 (B.C. S.C.); Livingston v. R (1919), 19 Ex.C.R.
521; Jacques Cartier Bank v. R (1895), 25 S.C.R. 84; Walsh Advertising v. R., [1962] Ex.C.R.
115; R v. Transworld Shipping Ltd, [1976] 1 F.C.R. 159; Wood v. R (1877), 7 S.C.R. 634.
20 [1977] 1 S.C.R. 41.
21 Of the cases cited in note 19, this was the view taken in Walsh Advertising, Livingston,
and, possibly, Jacques Cartier Bank. The other cases cited took the view that a Minister has
actual authority to make any contract in connection with the general functions assigned to him
by statute, by implication from such statutes.
22 It seems a Minister has the capacity to make contracts on behalf of the Crown
although the functions to which they relate may be carried on by him as persona designata,
not as agent of the Crown. This must be the case, since Ministers do not have an
independent capacity to contract: see infra, note 49.
23 On this see A- Hilliard, Case Comment (1976) 54 Can. Bar Rev. 401.
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common law rule is that an unincorporated body may neither sue
nor be sued on a contract, since only private individuals and
corporations have a legal personality. This rule may be abrogated
by statute, and where a public body is established by statute, it may
be deemed a "suable entity," either expressly or by necessary
implication24. When a power to enter into contracts is necessary for
that body to function effectively, clearly it must be a suable entity by
implication with the capacity to enter into contracts ancillary to its
functions in the same way as a corporate body.
A body which is not a Crown agent obviously needs a
capacity to contract in order to carry out its functions effectively.
A Crown agent, on the other hand, does not normally need an
independent capacity to make contracts. This is because it already
has a power to make any necessary contracts, by virtue of the
authority it possesses to contract on behalf of the Crown. The
capacity to contract in its own name is not in any way necessary for
it to function. Nevertheless, it is recognized that, in some cases at
least, a Crown agent does have the power to contract in its own
name, as well as on behalf of the Crown. It will be seen later that
the reason this power has been recognized is that it provides a
convenient device to avoid the operation of certain special rules and
immunities which apply to the Crown but not to other public bodies.
The nature of these rules and the precise significance of the
independent capacity doctrine from this perspective are considered
in the next section. Here, it is necessary to consider the scope of
this capacity, and also its nature: does it allow an agent to
undertake primary liability on a contract, or simply to make itself
party to an agreement made on behalf of the Crown?
1. Corporate Crown Agents
A number of cases have questioned whether a Crown agent
which is a corporation may contract in its own name. This
possibility was first acknowledged in the English King's Bench
decision in Graham v. Her Majesty's Commissioners of Public Works
24 Perelznec, supra, note 8.
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and Buildings.25 This case involved an alleged breach by the
government of a contract for the plaintiff to construct a post office.
At that time, the Crown enjoyed immunity from suit on its contracts;
the only way in which proceedings could be brought before the
court was by laying a petition of right, which required the Crown's
fiat, or permission, before it could be heard. To avoid the need for
a petition of right, the plaintiff sued the Commissioners instead of
the Crown. The court held that an action could be brought against
the Commissioners in their own name, and that the plaintiff could
proceed against them in an ordinary action rather than by petition
of right.
The two judges, however, took different approaches.
Phillimore J. based his decision on the view that whenever a
corporate Crown agent contracts on behalf of the Crown it may be
sued in its own name. He seemed to think that this should apply
whether or not the agent has actually purported to contract in its
own name as well as (or instead of) on behalf of the Crown. The
very purpose of incorporating such bodies, he reasoned, was to allow
them to be sued on their contracts in order to avoid the petition of
right procedure. He made it clear, though, that in other respects
the action should be treated as one against the Crown. The effect
of incorporation is simply to allow the agent to be sued in its own
name as a "nominal" defendant for the Crown.
26
Ridley . concluded that the Commissioners were liable to
suit on the view that they had actually contracted in their own
name. Clearly he envisaged that they possessed the capacity to
contract on their own behalf, as well as in the name of the Crown.
Although he acknowledged that both capacities may exist with
respect to the same contract, he did not contemplate the possibility
that both may be party to the same contract. Thus, he says:
The question here is, Have the defendants, or have they not, been acting in this
particular case in their capacity as agents of the Crown?... What we have to decide
25 [1901] 2 KIB. 781 [hereinafter Graham].
2 6 kid. at 790-91.
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here is whether the particular contract was made for and on behalf of the Crown,
or was a contract made by the Commissioners themselves.
2 7
It is not clear whether or not he thought that an authority is
primarily liable when it undertakes liability in its own name.
Several subsequent cases have also considered the liability of
corporate Crown agents to suit in their own name. One such case
is Gooderham & Worts v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,2s in
which an action was brought against the CBC for specific
performance of a lease and for damages for breach of its terms.
This case was different from Graham in that the corporation had
been given a specific statutory power to "sue and be sued" in
contract in its own name. The issue considered here was whether
the action was required to be brought in the Exchequer Court
rather than the provincial courts (the Exchequer Court had
jurisdiction if the contract were made on "behalf of the Crown").
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the provincial courts
did have jurisdiction. Riddell J.A. noted that the corporation had
been given "full power to contract" and thus should be able to have
its contracts dealt with by the ordinary courts. This seems to suggest
that the corporation has an independent capacity to contract, rather
than being liable simply as a nominal defendant for the Crown.
However, he did not investigate the capacity in which the
corporation actually contracted. The judgment of McTague J.A. is
also ambiguous on whether liability is merely nominal, or whether
it is dependent on the existence and exercise of an independent
capacity to contract. He cited the judgment of Phillimore J. in
Graham as authority for concluding that the corporation can be sued
in the ordinary courts, assuming that this follows from the fact that
the corporation can be sued in its own name. Unlike Phillimore J.,
McTague J.A. did not consider the mere fact of incorporation
sufficient for liability, but thought that this depended on the
construction of the particular statute. The corporation's liability to
be sued on its contracts in the ordinary courts could be inferred
since the corporation engages in activities all over the world and it
would be inconvenient if it could not be sued in the ordinary way.
2 7 id. at 787.
28 [1939] 4 D.L.R. 241 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Gooderhamn & Worts].
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Again, he did not consider in what name the authority actually
purported to contract. Although the judgements themselves are not
clear as to whether liability is merely nominal, it is difficult to see
how, if this is so, the contract cannot be considered to have been
made "on behalf of the Crown" for the purpose of the Exchequer
Court Act.29 It may be noted that the wording of the relevant
section was not actually discussed in the judgments. Nothing is said
by either judge to indicate whether the corporation is capable of
making itself primarily liable.
Another relevant case is McLean v. Vancouver Harbour
Commissioners,30 an action for damages for wrongful dismissal of a
servant of the authority. One of the questions for the court was
whether the Commissioners, a corporate body, could be sued in their
own name. It was held in the affirmative by Robertson J. Again it
is not considered in what capacity the authority had purported to
contract, and it is possible that the judge considered liability in its
own name to be automatic on all contracts made by the corporation
on behalf of the Crown.
The question of whether a corporate body may be sued in its
own name eventually arose for consideration by the Privy Council,
on appeal from Ontario in Intenational Railway Ltd v. Niagara
Parks Commission.31 In this case the Commission had taken over a
railway run by the plaintiff pursuant to an agreement. Compensation
had been settled by arbitration proceedings, but the plaintiff now
sought interest on the award. The agreement expressly stated that
it was made by the Commissioners "on their own behalf as well as
on behalf of and with the approval of the government of the
province of Ontario." The Plaintiff sued the Commission in the
courts rather than proceeding against the Crown by petition of right.
It was argued for the Commission that it only had capacity to make
29 This Act (R.S.C. 1970, c. E-11) was replaced by the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. F-7.
30 [1936] 3 W.W.R. 657 (B.C. S.C.) [hereinafter McLean].
31 [1941] A.C. 328 [hereinafter Niagara Parks].
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contracts on behalf of the Crown. This argument was accepted by
the lower courts.
32
The decision on this point, however, was reversed by the
Judicial Committee. Luxmoore J., giving the judgment, expressly
rejected the view of Kelly J. that the "Commission has no other
capacity than that of Crown agent or servant." He stated:
The Act of Incorporation plainly constitutes the commission as a corporation with
a separate legal identity, and in some, at any rate, of its powers it was obviously
recognised that it would have contractual capacity separate from the Crown, eg,
the power to make itself responsible for the moneys secured by debentures under
the Act, for it is provided that the repayment of the moneys secured by the
debentures 'may be guaranteed by the Crown'. This provision would be meaningless
if the Commission was not to be under any liability in the first instance.3 3
He concluded that the Commissioners had the power to undertake
liability on the contract and, as they had clearly purported to do so,
could be sued on it.
It is significant that the approach of the Privy Council is the
same as that of Ridley J. in Graham. The Court considers, first,
whether the relevant legislation has conferred a capacity to contract
on the agent, and, second, whether it has actually purported to
contract in that capacity. Clearly, the Court does not consider that
a Crown agent is automatically liable on any contract made by it on
behalf of the Crown simply because it possesses corporate status, as
Phillimore J. suggested in Graham. It seems to be assumed that the
power to make itself party to the contract exists for any contract
made on behalf of the Crown. But the Court does not consider
whether the agent might undertake primary liability; this was not at
issue, since the contract in question was clearly made on behalf of
the Crown.
32 See the earlier decision of Niagara Parks at [1940] O.R. 33 (C.A.).
33 See supra, note 31 at 342. The reasoning in this passage is open to some criticism.
The provision for the raising of money by debentures which is referred to by Luxmoore J.
seems to envisage a primary liability on the agent. If this were not so, there should be no
need for the Crown to guarantee the debentures since it would probably be liable to be sued
on the contrat anyway. The fact that the Crown agent has a power to undertake primary
liablity in some cases is hardly a basis for deciding that an agent may undertake liability on
a contract when it is acting on behalf of the Crown.
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Thus, the courts have recognized that at least some of the
corporate agents of the Crown may be liable to suit on contracts in
their own name although they are acting on behalf of the Crown.
Following the decision in Niagara Parks, it seems that their liability
will depend on the existence and exercise of an independent
capacity; they will not automatically be liable for all contracts made
on behalf of the Crown. As will be seen in the next section, this
approach is consistent with the position of unincorporated Crown
agents. It has sometimes been suggested that the position could be
affected by the provision found in the Interpretation Acts of both
Canada and Ontario, which state that all corporations can sue and
be sued.34 A similar clause has been included in a number of
English statutes setting out the powers of particular Crown agents,
stating that the particular agent can sue and be sued. Such clauses
have been held to render Crown agents liable to suit as nominal
parties for the Crown in respect of all contracts made through their
agency.35 It is submitted, however, that such an interpretation is not
plausible when applied to a section of a general statute dealing with
all corporations, many of which are not Crown agents.36 Clearly, the
section is intended to make clear that such bodies are suable
entities, liable to suit and able to sue on their own contracts. This
view finds specific support in McLean (discussed above) in which the
court, although considering the Commissioners liable to suit in their
own name, rejected the argument that this consequence followed
from a general clause stating that corporate bodies could sue and be
sued;37 the decision of the Court of Appeal in Niagara Parks also
supports this notion.38
However, in a case like Gooderham & Worts, where there is
a "sue and be sued" clause in the specific statute setting up the
34 Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 21(1)(a); Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.
219, s. 26(a).
35 Minister of Supply v. British Thomson-Houston Co., [1943] 1 K.B. 478 (C.A.); The
Brabo, [1949] 1 All E.R. 294 (H.L.), [1949] A.C. 326.
36 This seems to be the view taken in A. Smith, "Liability to Suit of an Agent of the
Crown" (1949) 8 U.T.L.J. 218.
37 Supra, note 30 at 659-60.
38 See supra, note 32.
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agency, it is still arguable that the agent will automatically be liable
on all contracts, though it is unclear whether in an independent
capacity or as a nominal defendant for the Crown. It also seems
that, as assumed in Niagara Parks, the power to contract in an
independent capacity will generally exist whenever there is a power
to contract on behalf of the Crown. If this power is recognized,
there are no reasons why it should be more limited.
At the federal level, the question of an agent's power to
contract in its own name when acting on behalf of the Crown is now
affected by section 97 of the Financial Administration Act.39 This
section states that all agent corporations may enter into contracts in
the name of the Crown or in the name of the corporation. An
agent corporation is defined 4° as any corporation wholly owned by
the Crown (or a wholly owned subsidiary of such a corporation)
which is declared by statute to be an agent of the Crown, but
excluding bodies classified in the F.A.A. as "departmental
corporations." Generally speaking, this definition includes most
Crown corporations engaged in commercial-type activities, while
excluding those involved in regulatory and advisory functions.
The effect of a similar provision was considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Yeats v. Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation,41 a case involving an alleged breach of a contract to
lend money for a house purchase to the plaintiff. The issue was
whether the provincial courts had jurisdiction over the question.
The statute creating the corporation in this case stated that "[t]he
corporation may, on behalf of Her Majesty, enter into contracts in
the name of Her Majesty or in the name of the corporation" and
further provided that "where the corporation has acquired or
incurred an obligation in the name of the corporation it may sue or
be sued in respect thereof in the name of the corporation."42 It was
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11 [hereinafter F.A.A.].
4 0 Ibid., s. 83(1) (see definitions of "agent corporation," "Crown corporation," and "parent
corporation!).
41 [1950] S.C.R. 513.
42 The Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act has been repealed, and the relevant
sections 5(2) and 5(4) are absent from its replacement, the Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-7.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
assumed for the appeal that the corporation had acquired or
incurred the obligation in its own name. On this basis, the court
held that the provincial courts did have jurisdiction over the claim.
It is not clear, however, whether the court considered the
defendant liable in an independent capacity, or whether the effect
of the section was simply to make it a nominal defendant for the
Crown in cases where it chose to contract in its own name. On the
one hand, the Court cites with apparent approval the decision of the
English House of Lords in The Brabo43 which seems to have been
decided on the basis that the defendant was rendered liable by
statute as a nominal representative of the Crown. The better
interpretation concludes that the defendant corporation was
independently liable in line with the common law because nominal
liability would seem to bring a body within the provisions of the
Exchequer Court Act. This Act requires that actions on contracts
made on behalf of the Crown be brought in the Exchequer Court
while the Yeats decision held that the corporation could be sued in
the provincial court. The parallel provision in the F.AA. is probably,
thus, to be considered simply as a confirmation and clarification of
the common law position regarding commercial Crown agents: when
engaged in functions on behalf of the Crown, they may undertake
contractual liability in an independent capacity should they so wish.
An important question remains as to exactly which corporate
bodies the independent capacity doctrine applies where the issue is
not dealt with by statute. At the federal level, this includes
corporate Crown agents which are not within the definition of "agent
corporation" under the F.AA. - those which are given the power to
contract in their own name by statute. In Ontario there is no
statute applicable to this question. At the federal level, the scheme
of the F.A.A. assumes that those corporate bodies outside the
definition - those classified as "departmental corporations" (generally
the non-commercial agents) - do not possess an independent
capacity to contract. Obviously, it would be sensible for the court
to construe legislation establishing specific corporations in the same
manner as the scheme adopted in the F.A.A. and to deny such a
capacity to those bodies. In jurisdictions where there is no statutory
Supra, note 35.
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guidance, the courts are perhaps likely to recognize an independent
capacity to undertake contractual liability according to whether or
not a body is commercial in nature. As will be explained in the
next section, this has been the approach with unincorporated bodies.
It is always possible, however, that such a capacity might be
recognized for all corporate Crown agents.
So far, the discussion has concerned contracts made by
Crown agents on behalf of the Crown. But what of the power of
Crown agents to undertake primary liability on their contracts? It
is submitted that it would be odd if an agent were able to undertake
primary liability on its contracts as a general rule. If the activity to
which the contract relates is generally being carried out on behalf of
the Crown with Crown funds, then ultimately Crown funds should be
used to meet any liability on the contract. Furthermore, Crown
agents often do not have assets of their own but hold all their assets
on behalf of the Crown.44 Thus, they obviously cannot undertake
primary liability. As a general rule, then, it is submitted that statutes
should not be construed as conferring on a Crown agent the power
to undertake primary liability on a contract.45 It is in fact now
widely provided for by specific statutory provisions that Crown
agents exercise their powers only as agents for the Crown, a policy
which seems to preclude such agents from primary liability.46 At the
In the federal jurisdiction, see F.A.A., supra, note 39, s. 94 (all property held by an
agent corporation is the property of the Crown).
45 There are provisions in a few statutes stating that a Crown agent may employ servants
on its own behalf and that such servants are not officers or servants of Her Majesty. An
example is the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-16, s. 14(1),
although the corporation is also stated to be "for all purposes an agent of Her Majesty in right
of Canada" (s. 5(1)). In Briere v. Canada Mortgage & Housing Corp. (1986), 30 D.L.R. (4th)
375 (Fed. C.A.), Marceau 3. commented that this provision "cannot but prompt surprise." He
could see no reason for it since the agent appears to have no independent assets; arguably,
section 14(1) should be construed subject to section 5(4) in determining liability in contract
with the Crown being primarily liable, and section 14(1) should be construed as having the
more limited application of taking away an employee's status as Crown servant for the
purposes of Crown immunity (as was held to be one consequence of the section in Briere).
This is suggested as a possible interpretation of another statutory provision which has been
held to make a servant an employee only of a Crown agent. See the discussion of Washer v.
British Columbia Toll Highways and Bridges Authority, infra at 602-3.
46 These provisions do not preclude the agency from making itself a party to a contract
which is made primarily on behalf of the Crown - see Perehinec, supra, note 8, where both
the agency and Crown were held liable on a contract where such a provisions applied.
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federal level, this is provided for in the FA.A. for agent corporations,
and it is frequently provided for in specific statutes setting up Crown
agencies. In Ontario, a similar provision applies to all bodies falling
within the definition of Crown agent under the Crown Agency Act.47
If an agent does have independent assets which are distinct
from those of the Crown, then it is not implausible for the
legislature to provide that certain of its expenditures are to be
deducted from those assets. A careful examination of the financial
structure of the agency and of its financial relationship with the
Crown is needed to see if this is an appropriate interpretation. A
body or person which is a limited Crown agent by agreement will, of
course, have its own assets, and will frequently make contracts
outside the scope of its own agency for its own purposes, on which
it will undertake primary liability.
2. Unincorporated Crown Agents
It is now necessary to consider the position ot
unincorporated authorities: when may a non-corporate Crown agent
contract in its own name? The category of unincorporated
authorities in the Canadian jurisdictions includes ordinary
governmental departments48 as well as a variety of other public
bodies. To be contractually liable, such a body must be a suable
entity, but this question often runs together with that of contractual
capacity. If the legislation confers a capacity to contract, clearly the
implication is that the authority is able to sue and be sued on those
contracts, and thus, is a suable entity at least to that extent.49
In several decisions it has been held that an unincorporated
Crown agent is not suable in contract. For example, Flexlume Sign
Co. v. Macey Sign Co.50 held that the Commissioner of Patents could
not be sued on a contract in his official capacity. The decision in
47 R.S.O. 1980, c. 106, s. 2.
48 In England, government departments have often been incorporated.
49 This was the approach adopted in Perehinec, supra, note 8, discussed later in this
section.
50 (1922), 69 D.L.R. 632 (Ont. S.C.).
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Graham was distinguished as only being applicable to corporations.
It is also widely accepted that Ministers of the Crown are not liable
to suit.
51
An unincorporated body was, however, recently held liable
in contract by the Supreme Court of Canada in Perehinec.5 2 The
case involved a claim for damages against the agency for breach of
an employment contract which the agency had purported to make
on its own behalf. The issue for decision by the Supreme Court was
the familiar one of whether the provincial court had jurisdiction over
the action. In this case, it was necessary to consider the application
of the Federal Court Act, the successor to the Exchequer Court Act,
which requires an action against the government to be brought in
the Federal Court where it "arises out of a contract entered into by
or on behalf of the federal Crown."53  The Court held that the
agency was liable on the contract in its own name, and that an
action against it could be brought in the provincial courts. This
applied, the Court said, even though the contract may have been
made also on behalf of the Crown (in which case, presumably, the
Crown would be primarily liable). In concluding that the agency was
capable of contracting in its own name, the Court relied on a
statutory provision which conferred on it a power to appoint staff
without any specific reference to capacity. It may be noted that,
like the Privy Council in Niagara Parks, the Court thought it
relevant to consider whether the agency had actually exercised the
power which it possessed to undertake liability in its own name; it
did not consider liability to be automatic on all contracts made on
behalf of the Crown.
What are the implications of this decision? As mentioned,
the Court relies on a specific section in the statute as conferring
contractual capacity. With corporate bodies, however, the courts
51 See Fox Hitchener v. Alberta (1977), 6 A.R. 43 (S.C.T.D) (dictum that Attorney
General not liable in contract in official capacity). The view that Mininsters who have no
corporate status are not liable in contract is expressed by Dussault & Borgeat, supra, note 6,
and is assumed in the English decisions considering the effect of "sue and be sued" clauses,
as to which see supra, note 35, and also Rowland v. Air Council (1927), 96 LJ. Ch. 470
(C.A.).
52 Supra, note 8.
53 See supra, note 29, s. 17(2)(b); see also infra, note 67.
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have assumed the capacity to contract arises by implication and
extends to all contracts made on behalf of the Crown. It is difficult
to see why unincorporated bodies should be in a different position.
It is submitted that the specific provision should be considered to
have been included ex abundanti cautela, and that the general
position should be applicable to corporate bodies.
Secondly, it is unlikely that this decision would be applied to
governmental departments, even where these are given a specific
statutory power to contract without reference to any particular
capacity, as is sometimes the case. It has generally been assumed
that such bodies always contract on behalf of the Crown. As with
corporate authorities, a distinction seems to exist between
commercial bodies and those of a more governmental nature in
determining whether these authorities may contract in their own
name.
Regarding the possibility ofprimary liability, the same points
made in relation to corporate authorities apply. Thus, when
exercising functions on behalf of the Crown, such bodies will
generally be able to contract only as Crown agents, although in
doing so they may render themselves liable to suit.
D. In What Capacity Is The Contract Made?
Where an authority possesses the power to contract only in
one capacity - either as agent for the Crown or independently -
that is the presumed capacity in which it will be considered to act
if the contract is unclear. We have seen that Crown agents
frequently have powers to make a particular contract both on behalf
of the Crown and in their own name (although it was suggested that
as a general rule they will not be able to undertake primary
liability). In such cases, who is party to the contract depends,
according to the approach adopted in the leading cases, on the
capacity in which the agent has actually purported to act. Thus,
having determined that a dual capacity to contract exists, it is
necessary to consider in whose name the contract has been made:
that of the agent, the Crown, or both?
In the context of determining the scope of the authority of
a public body acting for the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada
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in JE. Verault & Files LtDe v. A.G. Quebec54 stated that the ordinary
private law rules of authority apply. In determining the capacity in
which an agent acts in making a contract, the courts have similarly
followed the basic private law approach of giving effect to the
intentions of the parties to the contract, as determined through an
examination of their actions and/or any relevant documents, and
through the application of certain presumptions where their
intentions are unclear. However, the equation of the position in
public and private law cannot be taken too far because the nature
of the relationship between government entities is very different
from that between an ordinary principal and agent. A Crown agent
generally does not have assets of its own. The consequences of the
capacity in which liability is undertaken are also very different in
public and private law, as will be further explained in the next
section. Hence, the factors to be taken into account in construing
the intentions of the parties are very different; their actions and
documents cannot be interpreted in the same way as if both were
ordinary private parties, and special policy considerations may
sometimes be needed. Thus, although the basic approach is the
same in both public and private law, the specific rules and
presumptions of construction are inevitably somewhat different.
It is relevant first to consider the significance of a supposed
rule which has been invoked in a number of cases dealing with a
Crown agency. This rule states that where a person contracts as a
Crown agent, there is a presumption that he contracts only on
behalf of the Crown and does not undertake personal liability.55
Hence, although under the usual rules of construction an agent
might be considered to be undertaking personal liability, he will not
necessarily be considered to do so when acting as a Crown agent:
54 Supra, note 20.
5 5 MacBeath v. Haldimand (1786), 99 E.R. 1036 (K.B.); Gidley v. Lord Palmerston (1822),
129 E.R. 1290 (Common Pleas); Sumner v. Chandler (1878), 18 N.B.R. 175 (S.C.). It is said
that this is a supposed rule since in many other cases it has been blatantly disregarded, even
though lip service has been paid to it. See, for example, Scully v. Baillie (1834), 1 N.B.R. 407
(S.C.), and the cases referred to there by the reporter. No doubt these decisions were based
on the desire to ensure that the other contracting party received payment - at the time, they
were decided that the Crown itself could not be sued. It was assumed that although
troublesome for him, the agent would in practise be reimbursed (and was legally entitled to
be, the Crown no doubt being primarily liable).
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the clearest indication of an intention to be personally liable is
required. The reason for this rule, it has been said, is that any
other "would in all probability, prevent any proper prudent person
from accepting a public situation at the hazard of such peril to
himself."56
This rule has sometimes been invoked in cases dealing with
the liability of public authorities which are Crown agents. Thus in
Graham, Ridley J. accepted that this presumption was relevant in
considering the liability of the Commissioners, an incorporated public
body, but he held that the presumption had been overcome on the
facts of the case. It is clear, however, that given the stated rationale
for the rule, it can have no application where what is in issue is the
liability of a public authority as opposed to the liability of a private
individual: there is no policy objection to finding such an authority
liable on the contract. No doubt the point was appreciated by
Ridley J. who could not point to any specific evidence to support his
conclusion that the presumption should not apply. It is clearly
preferable that it should be openly acknowledged that the principle
has no application in such a case.
How is it, then, to be determined in what capacity, or
capacities, a contract is made where a dual capacity exists? In the
first place a person will, in public as in private law, be a party to the
contract where this is clearly stated. Thus, in Niagara Parks, the
Crown and the Commissioners were liable where both were named
as parties in the written contract. But it is not always clear from
the agreement who is a party to it; the documents may be
ambiguous, mentioning both principal and agent without stating who
is actually a party.57 Alternatively, only the principal or the agent
may be mentioned. In the latter case, under private law rules, this
fact will generally not be conclusive of who is a party. It may be
56 Dunn v. MacDonald, [1897] 1 Q.B. 401 at 406 (C.A-), Charles J.
57 This was the position in the English case of Town Investments v. Department of the
Environment, [1978] A.C. 359 (H.L.). The case is not particularly helpful, however, since
their Lordships seemed to assume (contrary to Niagara Parks) that it was not possible for the
authority to undertake liability as both the principal and agent; it is also unclear whether
many of their Lordships considered the Department to possess an independent capacity to
contract at all.
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shown that the other was also intended to be liable,58 and there is
no reason why this should not be so in public law also. In all these
situations, to resolve the question of who is a party to the contract,
one must determine the parties' intention. Some important
presumptions will assist in ascertaining this intention.
First, it is suggested that when the agent acts on behalf of
the Crown in making the contract, the Crown is intended to be a
party to it.59 The reason given is that most Crown agents hold their
assets on behalf of the Crown, so that if the agent alone is liable,
there may be no assets available to satisfy judgment. However, the
decision of the Exchequer Court in Johnston v. R.60 seems to be
contrary to this principle. Cassels J. held that a petition of right
did not lie against the Crown for the sum due under a contract
made by the Commissioners of the National Transcontinental
Railway; it was necessary to bring an action against the
Commissioners themselves. The judge acknowledged that the
Commissioners did not possess independent assets, but pointed out
that the Crown could, no doubt, in practice make the moneys
available. Although this may be so, it would be preferable to allow
the money to be recoverable as a matter of law to avoid any
possibility of payment being refused. It seems that the judge in the
case did not appreciate that both the Crown and its agent could
both be liable on a contract and based his conclusion on the
assumption that if the Commissioners themselves were liable, then
the Crown could not be. The Privy Council in Niagara Parks
subsequently made it clear that both could indeed be liable on the
agreement. In light of this decision, it is submitted that the
Johnston case should no longer be regarded as authoritative. It is
submitted that the Crown will generally be liable on any contract
made by its agent for Crown purposes unless there is clear evidence
that this was not intended.
What about the liability of the agent where such is not
expressly stated? In Niagara Parks, the Privy Council expressly
58 The "Swan," [1968] 1 Lloyds L.R. 5 (Adm.D.).
59 Although there is no general principle in private law that a principal is also liable
where the agent is; see Reynolds, supra, note 4 at 446.
60 (1910), 13 E'x.Ct. 155, aff'd on other grounds (1911), 44 S.C.R. 448.
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declined to comment on the "more difficult question 61 of what the
position would be if the agent had not been expressly stated to be
a party to the agreement. In Perehinec (in which it is not clear
from the case exactly what was stated in the documents), the
Supreme Court relied on a presumption in favour of the provincial
courts to conclude that the authority should be considered to have
contracted in its own name. This judgment may suggest that, at
least with federal Crown agents, there is a general presumption that
they have contracted in their own name, in order to ensure that
their contracts are subject to the jurisdiction of the provincial
courts.62 It may be, as will be explained in the next section, that a
finding that a contract is made in a dual capacity and not just on
behalf of the Crown may enable the courts to avoid applying special
Crown rules, which are sometimes inappropriate. If this is the case,
it may also encourage the courts to adopt a presumption of this
kind. However, the position is uncertain. In private law, the courts
have often been willing to find an agent to be a party to a contract,
either where this provides a particular advantage to the other party
to it, or where the agent is actually mentioned in the agreement.63
Before proceeding further, it is useful to summarize the main
propositions so far stated regarding the government's capacity to
contract:
(i) The Crown has an unlimited capacity to enter into
contracts at common law. Bodies which are Crown agents by statute
have the authority to exercise this power on its behalf in order to
make contracts which are reasonably incidental to the performance
of their statutory functions.
(ii) Some Crown agents also have a capacity to make
themselves party to a contract made on behalf of the Crown, with
or instead of the Crown. This capacity should be the same whether
the body is incorporated or unincorporated. This capacity is
probably possessed only by bodies of a commercial nature.
61 [1941] A.C. 328 at 342 (P.C.), Luxmore LJ.
62 It is not clear from the judgment in Perehinec itself whether the agent was mentioned
in the written contract.
63 See, generally, Reynolds, supra, note 4 at 426-47.
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(iii) Crown agents do not normally have the capacity to
undertake primary liability on contracts which are incidental to the
activities in which they engage on behalf of the Crown.
(iv) Where an agent has independent capacity, there is,
nevertheless, a strong presumption that the Crown is made party to
the contract. There may also be a presumption that the agent is
also liable, at least with federal agents. With some federal Crown
agents, the liability of the agent is provided for by statute as a rule
of law.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CAPACITY IN WHICH
CONTRACTS ARE MADE
We now turn to an examination of the significance of the
capacity in which the government is liable on a contract. This topic
was broached on in the previous section on several occasions, but it
must now be considered in more detail.
A. The Position of Government Bodies Inter Se
We must consider first the significance of the issue of
capacity for internal government relations: which funds are
ultimately to pay for the contract, those of the Crown or of the
agency? The question of primary liability is significant. It has been
mentioned that assets used by government agencies are generally
held on behalf of the Crown. Hence, the Crown is normally
primarily liable on government contracts, either by statute or under
the common law (although it is possible that an agent may have its
own assets and pay some of its liabilities from these).
An alternative legal regime might have each agency owning
all its own assets, with its own revenues and expenditures accruing
to and being paid for out of these assets. Such a regime might have
some advantages in ensuring that each agent is financially
accountable for its activities, and that any funding from external
sources is clearly apparent. At present, this accountability is a
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matter of internal government practice subject to the F.A.A.64 and
other statutory provisions. Clearly, under the present regime, the
relationship between the different institutions of government is quite
different from that between the normal principal and agent in
private law (where the agent has its own assets, used for its own
distinct purposes).
B. The Position of the Other Party to the Contact
1. General
The capacity in which a contract is made by an agent of
another may be important to the other party to the contract. This
other party is usually concerned with who is a party to the
agreement, and not with the issue of primary liability.
65
In public law, the question is significant for some of the
same reasons as in private law. In both cases, it is necessary to
know who is properly named as a party to the action. A mistake,
however, will not entail serious consequences: a party will simply be
required to pay the costs of amendment. It is more significant in
private law that the assets of a party to the agreement will be
available to satisfy a judgment against it, regardless of the question
of primary liability. This is important if either principal or agent is
insolvent. The prospect of a defendant becoming insolvent in the
usual way is, of course, remote in public law. But it has been seen
that government bodies often hold all their assets on behalf of the
Crown, so that the Crown itself must be party to the agreement. It
was suggested that there is a presumption to this effect. However,
the theoretical possibility remains that an agent may choose to
contract so as to render only itself liable to suit.
64 Supra, note 39.
65 There is a possible exception to this in public law if the application of special Crown
rules to an action against an agent depends on whether or not the Crown is primarily liable.
On this see the discussion later in this section.
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Other situations in which the question of contractual liability
often arises in private law - such as where the principal is outside
the jurisdiction 66 - are unimportant in public law. There are other
reasons why the question of contractual liability may be significant
in public law, arising from the existence of a number of special legal
rules applying to the Crown but not to other public bodies. In some
cases, at least, these rules do not apply where a Crown agent
contracts in its own name. However, as will be seen, the precise
significance of the independent contractual capacity of Crown agents
is in many areas very uncertain. It is now necessary to consider this
aspect of contractual capacity in more detail.
2. Jurisdiction of the Federal Court
One reason why it may be necessary to know who is party to
the contract is to determine in which court an action on the contract
should be brought: in the Federal Court or the provincial courts.
The former has exclusive jurisdiction under the Federal Court Act
over any claim against the federal government which "arises out of
a contract entered into by or on behalf of the Crown."67  Does this
provision apply where a Crown agent is sued in its own name on a
contract made for the purposes of the Crown? If not, it is necessary
to determine whether the contract is made in the name of the
Crown, the agent, or both, in order to know the appropriate forum68
for an action against the government.
The question is governed to some extent by section 98 of
the FA.A. 69 This provides that proceedings in respect of a contract
66 The difficulties led to a presumption that an agent acting for a foreign principal
intended to undertake personal liability. With the development of better communications, this
rule seems to be on its way out; see Reynolds, supra, note 4 at 435-36.
67 See supra, note 29, s. 17(2)(b). Although see Zutphen Brothers Construction v.
Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 433 (N.S. S.C.), holding the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court to be unconstitutional.
68 If the contract is made in the name of both, the plaintiff may choose the forum by
choosing whom to sue.
69 Supra, note 39, s.98.
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of an agent corporation 7° may always be brought in the court that
would have jurisdiction if the corporation were not an agent of the
Crown, even where the contract was concluded in the name of the
Crown. The scope of this provision is not entirely unambiguous. It
could mean that an agent corporation can sue in the provincial
courts on any contract which it makes, even if it is made only in the
name of the Crown. Alternatively, "entered into" might mean
"entered into in law" so that the agent can only be sued in the
provincial courts if it has actually contracted in its own name.
Probably the first interpretation is correct, since the section
embodies a policy decision that the contracts of these commercial-
type bodies may be dealt with in the ordinary courts if the plaintiff
so chooses. If this is so, it is unnecessary for this purpose to
determine whether the agent has contracted in its own name. It
may, though, be relevant to know whether the Crown is a party
should the plaintiff wish to sue in the Federal Court.
What is the position of Crown agents with a power to
contract in their own name which are not agent corporations?71
The question was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Perehinec72 in which an unincorporated authority was sued in its
own name. The court, relying on the presumption in favour of the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, held that the action could in such
a case be brought in the provincial court, even though the authority
was acting on behalf of the Crown. Thus, it seems that where a
body (which is not an agent corporation) concludes a contract for
the Crown, the plaintiff will still have the choice of forum if the
agent has made the contract in its own name. In this regard, the
position may differ slightly from that of an agent corporation with
which, it was suggested, the choice of forum exists under statute,
irrespective of the capacity in which the agent actually purports to
act.
70 For the definition of "agent corporation," see supra, note 39, s. 83(1).
71 It was suggested earlier that the only other federal authorities with a power to
undertake contractual liability in their own name are unincorporated bodies of a commercial
nature.
72 Supra, note 8.
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In contract actions brought by a Crown agent, the jurisdiction
of the Federal Court is limited to where the action is based on an
existing federal statute73 (though this is not usually the case).
Where the action is based on a federal statute, jurisdiction is
concurrent with that of the provincial courts "where the Crown or
the Attorney General of Canada claims relief."74  Normally the
Crown will be party to the contract and so will be able to choose
the forum; and arguably, it can also do so under this provision
where it is primarily liable, although not party to the contract.
The question of forum does not arise where an action
involves the Crown in right of a province as opposed to the Crown
in right of Canada; such actions are always brought in the provincial
courts.
3. Privileges and Immunities of the Crown
In addition to a special forum for the resolution of some
disputes it is involved in, the Crown enjoys a number of privileges
and immunities which may affect its position in contract. One
former immunity of great importance, which was mentioned in the
previous section, was the Crown's freedom from contractual suit in
an action: proceedings could be brought against it only by petition
of right. The need for a fiat to bring proceedings in contract was
long regarded as an unjustified anachronism 75 which has now
generally been abolished by statute in Canada
76 and Ontario. 77
However, a number of immunities remain which are relevant to the
Crown's contractual activities. In the first place, at common law an
73 Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054;
McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd v. R, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654.
74 Federal Court Act, supra, note 29, s. 17(5)(a).
75 The discretion to refuse a remedy has been exercised even in relatively recent times;
see the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Legal Position of the Crown (working
Paper No. 7) (Vancouver The Commission, July 1972) at 21-22.
76 Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50.
77 Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 393.
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injunction is probably not available against the Crown,78 and thus,
cannot be obtained to prevent or restrain a breach of contract by
the Crown. Specific performance is also unavailable although a
party may obtain a declaration of entitlement to such a remedy.79
Another special rule, which is also relevant from a contractual
context, is that the assets of the Crown cannot be subject to
execution when judgment is given against it.80 Special rules have
also been applied to the Crown's relationship with its servants.
Once it was arguable that such a relationship normally would not be
contractual at all. It was held recently in A. G. Quebec v.
Lebrecque8s that the Crown's relationship with a casual employee
was a contractual one. Authority still favours the existence of the
rule that unless there is anything to indicate to the contrary, servants
of the Crown are dismissable at pleasure.
8 2
Finally, there is the rule that the Crown is not bound by a
statute which would be burdensome to it unless expressly mentioned
in the statute.8 3 This rule is of diminished importance in relation to
contractual matters since the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Bank of Montreal v. A.G. Quebec.84 In that case, the government
claimed the amount of a cheque, with a forged endorsement, debited
to its account. The Bank raised the defence that legislation required
78 See J.M. Evans, De Smith's Judicial Review of Adrniistrative Action, 4th ed. (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1980) at 445.
79 Dominion Building Corp. v. R., [1933] 3 D.L.R. 577 (P.C.). In Ontario, these rules
have been embodied in statute; Proceedings Against the Crown Act, supra, note 77, s. 18.
80At the federal level, see Crown Liabiliy Act, supra, note 76, s. 17(1); Federal Court Act,
supra, note 29.
81 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1057.
82 See, for example, Clarke v. A.G. Ontario, [1966] 1 O.R. 539 (C.A.). This rule has
been subject to criticism in the Supreme Court; see Nicholson v. Haldimond-Norfolk Regional
Board of Comnmrs of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 at 332-33, Laskin CJ., and Nova Scotia
Government Employees Assn v. Civil Service Commission of Nova Scotia, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 211
at 222, Laskin CJ. However, it continues to be followed; see, for example, Malone v. Ontario
(1983), 45 O.R. 206 (H.C.).
83 Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 17; Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 219,
s. 11. The common law rule was that the Crown would not be bound unless this appeared
expressly or by necessary implication.
84 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 565.
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notice to be given of a forged endorsement within a year of
discovery of the forgery, which had not been done. In reply, the
government alleged that it was not required to give this notice since,
by virtue of Crown immunity, it was not bound by the statute in
question. The Court rejected this defence, and held that the Bank
was not liable to pay because the obligation arose not by operation
of law but by contract. The statute, the Court said, simply regulated
the terms of the contract, and since the Crown is bound by its
contracts in the same manner as private individuals, it could not rely
on its special "prerogative" here. Immunity, it was said, depends on
"whether the source of the obligation is contractual or legislative."
85
This considerably reduces the importance of this immunity in
relation to contracts, but it does not seem to cover all legislation
touching on contract such as that relating to the formalities for the
creation of contracts, or general legislation governing costs and
interest on judgments. The rule may, thus, still be of some
relevance in a contractual action.
All these immunities will apply when the party to an action
on a government contract is the Crown. But do they also apply
where a Crown agent sues, or is sued, in its own name? If not,
then clearly the existence of the agent's capacity to undertake
contractual liability in its own name may be of some importance.
Consider the case where a Crown agent contracting in its
own name acts on behalf of the Crown - that is, where the Crown
is primarily liable. This is usually the position; an agent rarely
undertakes primary liability. A number of decisions are relevant to
the question of whether Crown immunities apply in such a case.
First, there are the petition of right cases. As explained earlier, the
original development of the independent capacity doctrine was
prompted by a desire to avoid the anomalous petition of right
procedure; it was held that this procedure did not have to be used
where proceedings were brought against a Crown agent in its own
name, but that it could be used in an ordinary action in the usual
manner. It was seen that the approach of some judges was to
regard the agent as automatically open to suit as a nominal
defendant of the Crown. If this were the case, it would be expected
85 Ibid. at 574.
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that the usual Crown immunities would apply in any action against
the agent; this was expressly stated to be the case by Phillimore J.
in Graham. However, as noted, the Privy Council in Niagara Parks
took the view that a corporate agent's liability depends on the
possession and exercise of an independent capacity to undertake
contractual liability. On this approach, the conclusion that the
petition of right procedure does not apply to a Crown agent suggests
that the agent is not to be treated as the Crown for the purpose of
applying Crown immunities.
Arguably a similar conclusion is suggested by the reasoning
of the decisions considering the appropriate forum for actions under
the Federal Court Act. In Perehinec, it was held that an action
against a Crown agent in its own name did not arise out of a
contract made "by or on behalf of the Crown" for the purpose of
the Act, even though the agent was acting for the Crown, and the
contract was also made in the Crown's name. In other words, the
agent is not to be treated as if it were the Crown, in applying the
section where the Crown is primarily liable on the relevant contract.
A similar conclusion was reached in earlier cases dealing with
corporate agents of the Crown. However, all these cases could be
explained as turning on the constitutional presumption against the
ousting of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. This presumption
was expressly invoked in Perehinec in construing the relevant
statutory section.8 6  If explained in this way, they would not
necessarily be relevant in considering the application of other
immunities.
87
Another case which might be used to support an argument
that an agent sued in its own name does not benefit from Crown
immunity is Washer v. British Columbia Toll Highways and Bridges
Authority.88 In this case, the Court held that the rule that Crown
servants are dismissible at pleasure did not apply to a servant of the
86 Supra, note 8 at 521-22.
87 It will also be remembered that it is now provided by statute that agent corporations
may be sued in the ordinary courts. The decision in Perehinec may thus also be seen as an
attempt to bring the position of unincorporated bodies in line with those which are
incorporated.
88 (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 620 (B.C. C.A.).
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authority. However, it may be that the court based its conclusion
on the view that the agency was primarily liable on the contract: it
was said that the servant in question was "not a servant of the
Crown but only a servant of a Crown corporation which was an
agency of the Crown."89 This interpretation9° is supported by the
fact that the Court distinguished the power to employ servants from
other powers of the agent (whose powers were stated generally to
be exercisable on behalf of the Crown) on the basis that it was
conferred to capacity by a specific statutory provision without any
reference to capacity. Obviously, on this standing, the decision is
irrelevant to the case where the Crown is primarily liable. It may be
noted that if this is the correct interpretation, the decision is open
to criticism; the court does not address the question of whether the
agency had its own assets from which its servants could be paid.
Alternatively, the decision might be interpreted as meaning simply
that although paid by the Crown, the servant is not to be treated as
a Crown servant for the purpose of Crown immunity. However,
even if this is so, it does not provide authority for the general view
that Crown immunity does not apply when an agent is sued in its
own name because of the emphasis placed on the specific statutory
section.
These cases could all be interpreted as providing support for
the view that an agent sued in its own name does not enjoy the
benefit of Crown immunity, but they are not conclusive. Supporting
the contrary view, on the other hand, is the case of McLean.91 As
mentioned earlier, the case involved an action for unfair dismissal.
Having determined that the agency was suable in its own name, the
Court considered whether the rule that Crown servants are
dismissible at pleasure applied in an action against it. It held in the
affirmative: "in this regard the defendant's position is the same as
the Crown."92  Clearly, the judge is of the view that an agent
89 Ibid. at 628.
90 The Supreme Court in Perehinec seemed to interpret the decision in this manner,
assuming that the contract had been made on behalf of the Crown as well; see supra, note 8
at 538.
91 Supra, note 30.
92 Ibid. at 663.
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benefits from Crown immunities whenever it acts on behalf of the
Crown.
93
One final case to note in this context is Langlois v. Canadian
Commercial Corporation,94 a decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada. The corporation was sued in its own name on a contract
made on behalf of the Crown. The Court was required to consider
whether the corporation could take the benefit of the rule that the
Crown is not bound by statute unless expressly mentioned. (In this
case the relevant statute provided that interest should be paid on
damages). A statutory provision stated that the corporation could
be sued on contracts which it made on behalf of the Crown "as if
the right or obligation had been acquired or incurred on its own
behalf." It was held that the corporation could not take the benefit
of Crown immunity since had the obligation been incurred on its
own behalf, it would "stand in the same position before the Court
as any private corporation."95 The significance of this decision is not
entirely clear because of the ambiguity in meaning of "on its own
behalf." This phrase could refer simply to the agency contracting in
its own name, in which case the decision suggests that an agent sued
in its own name generally does not enjoy the benefit of Crown
immunity. On the other hand, it could refer to the agency
undertaking primary liability on a contract (which is the more usual
meaning of the phrase). If this is the case, then the decision has no
relevance in considering an agency's position when it acts for the
purposes of the Crown.
The case law in this area does not really provide a clear
answer to the question of how far an authority enjoys Crown
immunity when it is acting on behalf of the Crown but is party to an
93Although the Court considered that the agency was acting for the Crown (see ibid.)
and was entitled to the benefit of Crown immunity regarding the dismissal of servants, it also
reached the rather odd conclusion that an action was not required to be brought in the
Exchequer Court for a contract made "by or on behalf of the Crown"(emphasis added).
Furthermore, it has been suggested that where a contract is made by an authority as agent
of the Crown, there is a strong presumption that the Crown itself is party to the contract.
The conclusion that it was not, in this case, may be doubted. It seems that these conclusions
are based on an assumption that only the Crown or agent could be liable, and not both; that
both could be liable was established in the later Niagara Parks case.
94 [1956] S.C.R. 954.
95 Ibid. at 957.
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action in its own name. Can any guidance be found in the decisions
dealing with the application of immunity to Crown agents in other
contexts? Unfortunately, the uncertain state of contract law reflects
the long-standing confusion and controversy which pervades the
whole area of Crown immunity. Analogy is, thus, also incapable of
providing a conclusive answer to this question, or any clear
indication of the direction which the courts are likely to take.
On the one hand, there has been considerable criticism of
the scope of many immunities, and the courts have sometimes
avoided applying these even to bodies of a clearly governmental
nature. An example appears in the development of the persona
designata doctrine that allows the courts to apply to Ministers the
coercive remedies unavailable against the Crown.9 6  The notion
behind the doctrine's development - that public authorities do not
benefit from Crown immunity when acting in an independent
capacity - might suggest that immunity does not apply to a Crown
agent contracting in its own name. It is true that in acting as
persona designata a Minister is not acting on behalf of the Crown at
all, which an agent normally is when entering into contracts, but he
does use Crown revenues in carrying out these functions. Crown
agents have also been held to be liable in tort97 in an independent
capacity. They are not entitled to the common law Crown immunity
from suit even when the tort arises from the agent carrying out a
Crbwn purpose. This analogy suggests that an agent sued in its own
name in contract would not enjoy Crown immunity. A general
hostility to the current width of Crown immunities can also be seen
in the Supreme Court of Canada Crown decisions in A.G. Quebec
v. Labrecque and Bank of Montreal v. A.G. Quebec mentioned
earlier. Apart from criticisms of the existence or scope of certain
immunities, particular objection has been made to the application of
the immunity doctrines to bodies of a predominantly commercial
nature. It has been seen that the power to undertake contractual
liability in an independent capacity is probably confined to such
bodies. This view perhaps makes it particularly likely that the courts
96 See Air Canada v. A.G. British Columbia, [1987] 1 W.W.R. 304 (S.C.C.); R v. Leong
Ba Chai, [1954] S.C.R. 10; Minister of Finance of British Columbia v. R., [1935] S.C.R. 278.
97 Quebec Liquor Commission v. Moore, [1924] S.C.R. 540.
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will use the doctrine as a device to avoid Crown immunities,
meaning that these immunities would apply only to the more
peculiarly governmental authorities (whose reliance on some of the
present immunities is generally considered more justifiable).
All this suggests that the courts may be prepared to take the
view that an authority contracting in its own name does not enjoy
the benefit of Crown immunity. Nevertheless, some recent cases
have continued to uphold Crown immunity in the traditional manner
for agents engaged in functions on behalf of the Crown. The
traditional approach was recently adopted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd.98 In this case, the Court
held the corporation to be immune from the operation of the
Combines Investigation Act (which created certain criminal offences),
by virtue of the Crown's immunity from the burden of statutes in
which it was not expressly mentioned. The Court reached this
conclusion despite its own view that it was undesirable as a matter
of policy to apply the immunity to a commercial body of this kind,
and refused to accept the argument that the agent could not be
acting for the purposes of the Crown when engaged in unlawful
activity.9 9 In doing so, the Court clearly opted for tradition and
consistency. This approach would clearly favour applying Crown
immunity to agents contracting for Crown purposes, no matter in
which name any action is brought. In view of the conflicting
attitudes shown to Crown immunity by the courts in recent years, it
is difficult to predict what the attitude of the Supreme Court would
be to the present problem. The question must be considered to be
an open one.
There is much to be said for a policy of applying Crown
immunities to certain government activities, but not to those
involved in commercial-type activities. However, even if the courts
were to favour this approach, there are some problems with the
independent capacity doctrine (as applied in Niagara Parks and
Perehinec) as a device for achieving this end. This is because the
98 [1983] 2 S.C.R. 551.
99 Earlier in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. R., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 339, the Court held that
immunity does not apply where the agent acts outside the purposes of the statute. But, in
Eldorado, it refused to include all criminal or tortious activity within this principle.
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application of immunities in any given case will depend on two
things. First, it will depend on the capacity in which the agent has
purported to act in making the contract in question. An agent
could choose to make contracts only in the name of the Crown, and
thus ensure that it is always able to take the benefit of Crown
immunities. This problem can be met partially by a strong
presumption that a Crown agent contracts in its own name, but this
could be rebutted by clear words. Second, even where the contract
is made in a dual capacity, whether Crown immunities apply may
depend on the capacity in which the agent sues or is sued. Where
the agent itself is suing, it may be able to take the benefit of Crown
immunities by choosing to sue in the name of the Crown. Thus,
suppose a statute imposes limits on the contracting parties' right to
specific performance in certain circumstances, and there is no
express mention of the Crown, so that it is not bound. Even if an
agency would be bound by a statute if it sued in its own name, it
could avoid its imposed limitations by suing in the Crown's name.
The effect of any rule stating that a Crown agent does not enjoy the
benefit of Crown immunities when sued in its own name will be
mitigated since Crown agents often do not own independent assets.
Thus, although a plaintiff may be able to succeed in his action by
suing the agent in order to avoid the application of Crown
immunities, it may be futile to do so where damages are sought,
since there may be no assets from which the judgment can be
satisfied. This route is unsatisfactory since an element of
arbitrariness and inconsistency is introduced into this area of the
law.
So far we have considered the case where an agent contracts
in the course of carrying out functions on behalf of the Crown. But
what is the position where a Crown agent acts entirely on its own
behalf - that is, where it is primarily liable on a contract? It has
been said that the decision in Washer v. British Columbia Toll
Highways and Bridges Authorityz ° may be such a case. Here, the
Court concluded that although the authority itself was a Crown
agent, its servant was not a servant of the Crown and hence could
not be dismissed at pleasure. If this is based on the view that the
100 Supra, note 88.
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contract was not made on behalf of the Crown, then it tends to
suggest that Crown immunities do not generally apply where an
agent undertakes primary liability. Apart from this case there seems
to be no other authority relevant to this point. Where a body is a
Crown agent for most purposes under statute it is perhaps open to
debate whether it should enjoy immunity in respect of other
functions also. However, where a company or individual is made a
Crown agent by agreement for limited purposes, it is quite clear that
it cannot by virtue of that agreement enjoy Crown immunities in
carrying out its own independent functions!
4. Immunity of Crown Agents from Warranty of Authority Rule
It is relevant also to mention briefly another special rule
which is not an immunity of the Crown itself, but which applies to
individual Crown servants which exceed their authority to contract
on behalf of the Crown. Normally an agent acting outside the scope
of its authority in making an agreement is liable to indemnify the
other party for loss it suffers as a result of the alleged principal not
being bound by the contract; it is said that the agent gives an
implied warranty that he has authority to act for the principal. This
rule, however, has no application to individuals contracting on behalf
of the Crown.101  The rationale for the rule (as with the
presumption against the personal liability of Crown servants) is that
persons would otherwise be deterred from entering the service of
the Crown.' 02 It could perhaps be argued that the rule does not
apply where an individual purports to bind a Crown agency in its
own name, but has no authority to do so. In such case, the other
party to the agreement could then recover for loss suffered from the
agency not being bound. As with .the application of immunities
which benefit the Crown itself, it is difficult to predict what the
attitude of the courts is likely to be.
101 Dunn v. MacDonald, supra, note 56.
102 As with the presumption against the personal liability of Crown servants, this rule
also should not apply to public bodies acting as agents of the Crown since this policy
consideration has no relevance in such a case.
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5. Miscellaneous
The question of the capacity in which a contract is made
could also arise in a miscellany of other contexts with the application
of both statutory and common law rules. A case where this problem
arose, in considering the application of a statute, is the English case
of Town Investments v. Minister of the Environment.103 The House
of Lords had to decide whether certain premises were protected
from rent increases under counter-inflation legislation. For the
relevant statute to apply, it was necessary that the tenant and the
occupier be the same person. A lease had been made through the
Department of the Environment, which provided accommodation for
other government bodies. The premises were occupied by officials
of another department. It was argued that the Minister of the
Environment was the tenant and not the Crown, and that since the
premises were occupied by a different department, the tenant and
occupier were not the same person. The court held, however, that
the lease had been entered into on behalf of the Crown and the
premises were also occupied on behalf of the Crown. Hence the
legislation applied.
This particular question was approached by considering in
what capacity the government had actually purported to contract.
It is submitted that it is inappropriate that the application of the
legislation should have depended on this point. It would have been
preferable to have taken a less technical approach in construing the
meaning of the statutory terms tenant and occupier, and to have
considered whether the two were in substance the same, having
regard to the policy of legislation. Since the Department had been
acting as a common service agency in making the contract, certainly
the conclusion reached was correct, but it would have been better
to have looked directly to the realities of the relationship between
different government agencies, rather than analyzing the problem in
terms of technical private law relationships. This is a point to be
considered should the question arise in any similar context.
103 Supra, note 57.
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A COHERENT
APPROACH
It has been explained that the Crown has a capacity at
common law to make contracts, and that Crown agents have the
authority to exercise this power on its behalf in order to make
contracts in connection with the functions which they carry out. In
addition, some Crown agents - as a general rule, those of a
commercial as opposed to an administrative nature - have the power
to make themselves party to a contract, as does the Crown. Since
they have the power to make any necessary contracts by acting in
the name of the Crown, Crown agents do not need any power to
contract in their own name in order to function effectively. The
reason such a power has been recognized by the courts is to avoid
applying to these bodies certain special Crown rules and immunities
- in particular, the former requirement for a petition of right for
contractual proceedings against the Crown, and the statutory
provisions for actions against the Crown to be brought in a special
court.
As noted, an argument can be made that Crown privileges
and immunities generally do not apply when a public authority is
party to a contract in its own name. If this is so, then Crown
immunities will rarely apply to the contractual activities of Crown
agents which are commercial in nature. This view is attractive to
many who feel that such commercial bodies should not enjoy the
benefit of such privileges, even if their application to bodies of a
more governmental nature is justified. However, as explained, the
law on this question is currently uncertain: it is unclear whether the
independent capacity doctrine has any current significance for third
parties apart from the question of the appropriate forum for
bringing an action. This position is, as indicated, both a reflection
and a consequence of the confused state of the law relating to
Crown immunities generally. The Law Reform Commission of
Canada, in its recent Working Paper, The Legal Status of the Federal
Administradon,10 has called for a thoroughgoing legislative review
of the operation and scope of Crown privileges. The confusion and
104 See Working Paper No. 40, supra, note 3.
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uncertainty in the law relating to the contractual powers of the
Administration clearly illustrates the urgent need for a review of this
nature.
To the extent that the scope of special Crown rules have
been curtailed through the development of the common law, it has
been seen that the use of the independent capacity doctrine to
achieve this end is far from ideal. In the leading decisions, both the
Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada have adopted the
approach of treating the Crown and the specific public authorities
acting as its agents as distinct legal entities with a separate capacity
to contract, and have applied to these the same concepts of agency
as apply between private persons (rather than simply treating public
authorities as nominal Crown representatives as was suggested in
some of the early judgments). It was seen that the effect of this is
to make the scope of Crown immunities dependent to some extent
on the choice of the parties. Their operation may depend, first, on
the capacity in which the parties choose to contract and second,
where the contract is made in a dual capacity, on the capacity in
which an agent is party to the action (which may depend on its own
choice). Although in practice this may cause infrequent problems,
in principle the approach is unsatisfactory. Obviously in any reform,
any relevant immunities should apply, where apt, as a matter of law,
and not depend on the intentions of the contracting parties.
Where the legislature has intervened in this area, the
approach has also been unsatisfactory. Generally this has been done
by imposing reforms on top of the basic principal-agency model
developed by the common law. This has been the case even when
laying down rules which are to apply as a matter of law (as, for
example, with the provision considered in Langlois). Because of the
complexity of this basic model, this approach has sometimes
introduced unnecessary uncertainty and ambiguity into the law. It
is submitted that any reform of this area should abandon this dual
capacity model entirely and state the scope of any relevant rules
clearly and simply by reference to the body or functions to which
they are to apply.
Finally, it should be emphasized that apart from its role in
limiting the operation of special Crown rules, the dual capacity
doctrine is largely redundant. The concept does not fulfil the same
functions in public law as in the private sphere, where the law is
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generally concerned with the relationship between distinct persons
with their own separate interest and own assets. The relationship
between the various organs of government is wholly different in
nature and throws up completely different problems. It has already
been suggested that it is not an appropriate doctrine to employ in
dealing with the problem of Crown immunities; equally it is
submitted that it is not a helpful concept in considering other
problems relating either to the dealings of government bodies inter
se or their relationship with outside parties. In its recent Working
Paper, the Canada Law Reform Commission also called for a more
general reform of the current dual status of the central
Administration at the federal level; the examination of the operation
of this duality in relation to contractual powers provides clear
support for the arguments for reform on this point. The duality
doctrine developed as an ad hoc response to specific problems of
Crown immunity; these problems would be better dealt with in other
ways, and its present operation produces a complexity and
uncertainty which is surely out of place with the needs of the
modern commercial world.
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